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An unfortunate feature of this study is a failure to embody some of the later work in the association method and the consequent masking of the light which this excellent material contains for the problems raised. As was pointed out in Jung's work, and has been confirmed, a most significant feature of the free association method is in the "predicate" category and its congeners. It is about the "*Sachlicher Typus*" and "*Prädikattypus*" that the recent work on the method has chiefly centered. This distinction is quite ignored in the present study, and as the material is presented, the reader can not work it out for himself. It is a mystery how any one with the knowledge of Jung's work that was evidently at the author's disposal could have lumped together such diverging mental mechanisms as are implicit in the original group of "inner" associations, or failed to take effective account of essential similarity of the egocentric and predicate mechanisms. The original Jung classification was cumbersome, but its detail showed the relative significance of its constituents, and the lines on which simplification should take place, in combining groups of similar significance or lack of it. This is far from what is done in the work of present reference. It goes back to where Jung began and stays there.

"A broader criticism to be made of these two papers is one that applies to much of the work from their common source. There seems to be no adequate conception of the significance of variability. In a school that makes so much of individual psychology, it is regrettable that individual differences should be all but ignored in a study whose material must contain much of value for their understanding." These remarks, made years ago of two contributions in the psychoanalytic *Jahrbuch*, apply somewhat in the present instance, though not to the same degree. Huber tabulates his individual cases, so that one may determine for himself the constancy of central tendencies, and calls occasional though hardly sufficient attention to the limited significance of small group differences. Statistical refinements manifest rather deliberate headway in the intellectual sources of this paper. The individual variations are often so large that the group differences reported have but limited meaning so far as their individuals are concerned.

F. L. WELLS.

MCLEAN HOSPITAL.

Theology as an Empirical Science. DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH.
New York: Macmillan Co. 1919. Pp. 261.

"If any one is able to make good the assertion that his theology rests upon valid evidence and sound reasoning, then it appears to

me that such theology must take its place as a part of science." This challenge from Huxley is accepted by Professor Macintosh. "It is high time," declares this writer, that the possibility of resting theology on valid evidence be insisted on. The book under consideration presses this point, and attempts to show not only that religious experience at its best has already given us knowledge of the divine reality, but that this knowledge, by an inductive procedure, may be developed and amplified.

Until the seventeenth century, theology was traditionalistic, and unsatisfying because uncritical; in the eighteenth century it was rationalistic, but lacking in real religious content; in the nineteenth century it was mystical or eclectic, and too subjective to gain universal approval. In the twentieth century may it become scientific? It may and will, affirms Professor Macintosh, if religious pragmatism becomes scientific—that is, if it becomes sufficiently critical to distinguish between that sort of "working" which is its own verification, and other sorts which are not verifiable. Theology must become empirical; it must look to religious experience for its data. And in so doing it must not be confused with the psychology of religion, with which Leuba and others would identify it. For the psychology of religion merely describes one department of mental activity. Theology as an empirical science must describe, not religious experience, but the object known through religious experience.

Scientific theology, like other empirical sciences, will have its distinctive presupposition. As chemistry assumes the existence of matter and the possibility of knowledge about it, so empirical theology will posit the existence of God, not in a provisional way, as a working hypothesis, but with assurance, on the basis of religious experience. This is justifiable, for religious experience has shown immediately that God is, though what God is may not be clear without reflection. The nature of God is what we are investigating. Starting with the definition of God as the ultimate object of religious dependence, or the source of religious deliverance, and finding his data in religious experience at its best, the author endeavors to show what may be said about the religious object.

A clear appreciation of the practical, common-sense attitude which prompts the author to make this initial statement—that God is already known as the object of religious dependence—is important for the reader: first, because this attitude is reflected frequently as the argument proceeds, and second, because the latter part of the book, dealing with theological theory, draws conclusions using this statement as a major premise. If this first postulate be granted, the reader will find the remainder of the argument con-

vincing. Professor Macintosh goes into some detail to make sure that it is understood. The assumption, he says, is made, as in other sciences, on the basis of pre-scientific experience with the object. A pre-botanical experience with plants is necessary before botany proper begins. And a pre-theological experience of the divine reality is necessary for theology. This religious intuition, like the awareness of one's own existence, or of the existence of others, is an instance of perception in a complex. In the complex of religious experience at its best the subject empirically intuits an object of religious dependence which proves to be a source of religious deliverance. If this be dogmatism, at least it is scientific. It is making a common-sense, critically defensible assumption for purposes of investigation. (The author later remarks that the complete justification of this position will be undertaken in a volume to be called *The Problem of Religious Knowledge*.)

Beginning then with the knowledge that God is and inquiring what God is, the author develops his argument under three main heads: Theology's Presuppositions, Its Data and Laws, and Its Theory. Along with the existence of God theology presupposes freedom, which is theoretically possible because of the continuous flow of time, and morally certain because of our consciousness of responsibility. Immortality, another presupposition, has never been proved impossible—it is in fact probable, for if the mind is free and can originate changes in the brain, may it not be sufficiently independent to survive changes in the brain?

Under Empirical Data the author discusses revelation. If a theology can be discovered which will be both natural and revealed, it will retain the vitality of historic religion while achieving the validity of science. Religious consciousness at its best means experience of the religious object as present. Revelation and religious perception thus become correlative terms. In the life of Jesus we find the supreme justification of experimental religion. For the secret of his power was his spiritual preparedness, which means his right relation to the object of his religious experience. Jesus's life is revelation because through it we understand what God's nature must be. And the Christian experience of salvation is revelation in that it shows how all things are possible to the man who keeps his religious adjustments in order.

Under the head of Theological Theory the author infers the morally ideal character of God—since on practical religious grounds God must be, rationally He may be, and in religion at its best He is found to be sufficient for man's religious needs. In the same way we may reason that God is omnipotent in the sense of being able to do all that man needs to have done for him by divine power;

with God all things that faith has the right to demand are possible. Similarly, He must be omniscient, self-dependent and a unity. We know that prayer is always answered, for we know that there is a dependable response to the right religious adjustment. Eschatologically, empirical theology looks for the increasing influence of the Christian attitude and spirit. And with regard to the problem of evil, it can only say that in the best possible kind of world there must be freedom and so there must be opportunity for mistakes.

In the Appendix the author sketches an outline of the philosophy of religion showing the relation of empirical theology to philosophy. He suggests a method called "Critical Monism" for the solution of problems of epistemology and psychophysics.

The theology thus presented has attempted, by a synthesis of rational and empirical procedures, to relate itself to the data of religious experience as physical sciences are related to the data of sense experience. It is a timely, constructive effort to build a workable system of doctrine which shall meet the tests of common sense and critical reflection. It will therefore be especially valuable for the religious worker who is interested in the philosophic implications of his belief.

J. S. BIXLER.

AMHERST COLLEGE.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

MIND. October, 1919. *Introspection* (pp. 385-406): J. LAIRD. - "It seems both legitimate and necessary to assume that introspection has the same general characteristics as any other mental process by means of which we are able to apprehend the truth of fact." The thesis of this paper is that introspection ought to be regarded as a kind of cognition, "a kind of observation implying direct acquaintance with its object." *The Epistemology of Evolutionary Naturalism* (pp. 407-426): R. W. SELLARS. - "Penetrative intuition or literal inspection of the physical world is impossible. . . . The conformity between knowledge-content (understood propositions) and determinate being rests upon such a use of revelatory data as to enable us to gain insight into the determinate structure, capacities, and relations of physical things." *Mr. Joachim's Coherence-Notion of Truth* (pp. 427-435): A. R. WADIA. - Enumerates and discusses four chief weaknesses in Joachim's notion of truth. *An Ambiguity and Misconception in Plato's Idea of Morality in the Republic* (pp. 436-446): P. LEON. - The false idea of morality sponsored by Plato is that the essence of morality consists of "the full and harmonious development of all the faculties of a man." *Sense-Knowledge* (II).